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Current Issues in Turkish Network Industries 
In Turkey, following the economic crisis in 2001, comprehensive 
market-based reforms were launched in several sectors, including 
the network industries, such as telecommunications, electricity, and 
aviation. Privatisation of certain units has enabled the stimulation 
of investments in different segments and the establishment of 
sector-specific regulatory authorities, which in turn have resulted 
in significant improvements. However, the introduction of 
competition and regulatory achievements in the electricity and 
the telecommunications industries, have been slower than initially 
anticipated. Excessive infrastructural investments have created 
uncertainty around the future of the airline industry. Moreover, 
emerging platforms on the internet are witnessing problematic 
regulatory interventions. 
This special issue of the Network Industries Quarterly will be 
dedicated to papers related to these developments currently observed 
across the network industries in Turkey. Academics and practitioners 
discuss the aforementioned evolutions in the electricity, broadcasting, 
airline, and platform industries. 
Köksal and Uçar examine the public interventions towards the 
platform industries in Turkey. They emphasise the influence of 
interest groups and potential welfare effects of those interventions.
Gökdemir assesses the controversial decision of Turkish Competition 
Authority on sahibinden.com, which is the biggest classified 
advertisement platform in Turkey.
Ardıyok and Sağmanlıgil evaluate the draft regulation of Internet 
broadcasting in Turkey by including a comparison with other 
countries’ regulations.
Delibaşı provides a feasibility analysis on the Istanbul Airport by 
simulating the number of passengers under two different scenarios 
for the following thirty years.
Eroğlu analyses whether it is possible to increase renewable energy 
production without incentives and excessive regulation. He examines 
unlicensed electricity regulation in Turkey as an example.
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Public interventions in platform industries: The role of interest 
groups and potential welfare effects
Emin Köksal*, Belkıs Gökçe Uçar**
We examine the public interventions towards the platform industries in Turkey. Through a regulatory and an antirust intervention, we emphasise the 
influence of interest groups and potential welfare effects and conclude that the public interventions benefit the relevant interest groups at the expense 
of other parties. Moreover, each of these interventions has potential negative effects specific to platform industries.
Introduction
The value created by platforms that operate as in-termediaries between different customer groups has been increasing around the world. In parallel 
to their share in added value, their market power also in-
creases. Entities that use these platforms to reach the final 
consumers have been troubled by such a distributional 
change as it causes their share in the value-added process to 
decline. They then call for public intervention to reverse it.
However, as the political economy literature suggests, 
public interventions generally benefit some parties at the 
expense of others (Krueger 1974). Moreover, any public 
intervention in platform industries may have unintended 
consequences (Tirole 2015). In this paper, we analyse the 
public interventions towards the platform industries in 
Turkey; in particular, we try to emphasise the influence of 
interest groups and potential welfare effects of the inter-
ventions through two cases. 
Regulation for meal card platforms
In recent years, platform services have been on the agenda 
of Turkish authorities. Meal card platforms are examples of 
those services that have drawn attention and criticism from 
various actors. Currently, four platforms that dominate the 
Turkish market have been accused of charging high com-
mission fees. A meal card platform is a multisided platform 
that operates as a payment intermediary. On one side of 
the platform are member restaurants that accept the card 
and on the other side are companies that load credits on 
the card for their employees. According to Turkish tax law, 
benefits paid to employees, such as meal payments, can be 
exempted from the corporate income tax. Such legislation 
has incentivised companies to work with meal card plat-
forms.
A typical meal card platform charges a commission fee 
from the restaurants and subsidizes the companies. A typi-
cal meal card platform charges 10−12 per cent commission 
from the restaurants and subsidises the companies 5−6 per 
cent for their loaded credits. Overall, the platform receives 
revenue of 5−6 TRL for each 100 TRL spent on the plat-
form.
In 2017, the association of restaurants and chambers of 
commerce of two big cities, Istanbul and Ankara, had start-
ed to complain via the media about high commission fees 
being charged by the platforms. The association of restau-
rants even decided to stage a day-long boycott against the 
platforms. After a series of meeting and negotiations with 
the platforms in the presence of the Ministry of Trade, a 
settlement was reached. In the Official Gazette on 22 May 
2018, a regulation was enacted that capped the commis-
sion fees from the restaurants at 6 per cent and forbade the 
platforms from subsidising the companies. 
Overall, the regulation preserves the revenue stream of 
the platforms, but changed its allocation. More concretely, 
the platforms still receive 6 TRL for each 100 TRL spent, 
but now restaurants pay less, and companies are no longer 
allowed to be subsidised. Accordingly, the welfare effects of 
this regulation indicate a situation in which the restaurants 
are better off, companies are worse off, and no welfare 
change occurs for the platforms. 
However, effects on competition dynamics may poten-
tially emerge in the long run. Before presenting our argu-
ments on this issue, we will briefly mention a few concepts. 
A platform must create a feedback loop − called a network 
effect − in order to sustain its profitability in a multi-sided 
market. For instance, for a meal card platform creating a 
feedback loop there must be enough number of restaurants 
on one side and enough users (companies’ employees) on 
the other side. This phenomenon is known as the chicken-
and-egg problem (Caillaud & Jullien 2003) and requires 
the platform to achieve critical mass, in terms of numbers 
of customers, on each side of the market.
This point is more crucial for an entrant platform. The 
most common strategy for an entrant platform to achieve 
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critical mass and solve the chicken-and-egg problem is 
penetration pricing (Katz & Shapiro 1994; Shapiro & Var-
ian 1998). The fundamental mechanism of the penetration 
pricing strategy is based on applying lower prices for the 
money side and giving higher benefits to the subsidy side. 
Thus, an entrant platform utilises this pricing mechanism 
to gain ground in a multi-sided market. However, with 
the regulation, the penetration pricing becomes practically 
non-effective, since an entrant platform is not allowed to 
provide benefits to the company side. One can argue that 
applying lower commission fees for the restaurants may 
be sufficient for ignition. However, as David Evans and 
Richard Schmalensee (2016) put it, you can’t have chick-
ens without eggs but you need chickens to get eggs. Ac-
cordingly, a platform cannot attract restaurants without 
users, and no restaurant would be a member of the system 
that had no users available. Thus, we argue that, in the 
long-run, the regulation functions as an entry barrier and 
favours the existing platforms.
To sum up, the regulation for the meal card platforms, 
which was urged by the association of restaurants and 
chambers of commerce of two big cities, favours the main 
interest groups in the market. The short-run effects of the 
regulation indicate a situation in which the restaurants are 
better off, the companies (and, indirectly, their employees) 
are worse off, and the incumbent platforms secures their 
revenue stream. In the long run, the regulation restricts 
potential entries through limiting the pricing behaviour of 
entrant platforms.
Excessive pricing intervention: Sahibinden.com anti-
trust decision
Another interesting intervention to the platform indus-
tries is the Turkish Competition Authority’s (TCA) sa-
hibinden.com decision in 2018 (TCA 2018). The TCA 
decided that sahibinden.com − the largest classified adver-
tisement platform in Turkey − abused its dominant posi-
tion through applying excessive pricing in the market for 
online classified ad services for car dealers and real estate 
agencies. 
The investigation started with a complaint by associations 
of car dealers and real estate agencies. Then the relevant 
general directorate of the Ministry of Trade became in-
volved in the case as an additional plaintiff. Despite the 
opposing view of the majority of the reporters, the board 
decided that the platform had abused its dominant posi-
tion by applying excessive pricing. This was, to our knowl-
edge, the first ever antitrust decision for excessive pric-
ing in online platform services. According to the TCA, 
sahibinden.com has a dominant position in the relevant 
market and abused this position by applying significantly 
higher prices than its competitors. The TCA also added 
that the price increases are non-proportional to the rise in 
company’s cost. More interestingly, the TCA ruled that, in 
order to stop the violation, sahibinden.com should apply a 
price increase that is ‘reasonable’ and can be explained by 
the rise in its cost.
From the competition policy perspective, prohibiting ex-
cessive pricing is not an unusual application, especially for 
monopolies or de-facto monopolies. However, for the plat-
form industries − in which commercial innovation plays a 
significant role to gain a competitive advantage − it is hard 
to figure out the objective of the decision. Moreover, the 
guidance in the decision for a lawful pricing (being cost 
basis and a ‘reasonable’ price increase)  is odd for such a 
dynamic market in which frequent entries and exits occur.
When we look at the potential short-run effects the deci-
sion, we argue that the car dealers and the real estate agen-
cies are better off and the platform is worse off. However, 
for the other side of the market (users/viewers) it is diffi-
cult to make an assessment at first sight. To elaborate the 
possible effects on them, we need to introduce a specific 
concept. 
Pricing mechanism and its functioning in platform in-
dustries are more complex than in a single-sided market. 
In multi-sided markets, any price intervention may have 
further effects than initially anticipated. For instance, if a 
price intervention occurs on one side of the market, the 
platform offsets its loss from other side(s). In other words, 
the platform compensates its loss by charging the other 
side(s) of the market more or by subsidising them less. This 
phenomenon is known in the economic literature as the 
waterbed effect (Schiff 2008). 
As a classified ad platform, sahibinden.com charges ad-
vertisers and provides free services to users/viewers. Those 
free services include innovative services such as customis-
able search, individual pricing alerts, historical price/rent 
indexes, etc. In this respect, the platform implicitly subsi-
dises the users/viewers. As the theory and empirical find-
ings related to the waterbed effect put it, a limit on pricing 
on one side has the potential to decrease the quality of the 
free services given on the other side (Genakos & Valletti 
2012). Thus, we argue that the price intervention indicates 
a situation where users/viewers are worse off.
The possible long-run effects of the decision are beyond 
the relevant market. The guidance in the decision for a 
lawful pricing may have a potential negative effect on in-
novative business models. In platform industries, the value 
(and hence the pricing) of the product is not closely relat-
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ed with the cost of production. The friction solved in the 
market and the magnitude of the network effects are the 
main determinants of the value of the product (Parker et 
al. 2016). Moreover, the commercial innovations adapted 
as novel business models have both cost-saving and val-
ue-creating effects. Considering the guidance in the deci-
sion, we argue that such guidance will disincentivise the 
creation of innovative services.
To conclude, the TCA’s sahibinden.com decision takes 
an unusual antitrust approach towards the platform in-
dustries. While the decision favours the interest groups, 
the possible effects on the ultimate consumers are ignored. 
Moreover, the guidance in the decision for a lawful pricing 
creates uncertainty for the invention of novel services.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the public interventions towards 
the platform industries in Turkey. Through a regulatory 
and an antirust intervention, we emphasise the influence of 
interest groups and potential welfare effects. We conclude 
that the public interventions benefit the relevant interest 
groups, which urge for these interventions, at the expense 
of other parties. Moreover, each of these interventions has 
potential negative effects specific to platform industries.
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Can Antitrust Authorities’ Intervention to Pricing Strategy of 
Multi-Sided Platforms Enhance Competition in the Market?
Bülent GÖKDEMİR*
Digital markets have been among the fast-growing businesses over the last three decades. Compared to traditional offline markets, network effects lead 
to non-traditional pricing behaviour in digital markets; namely, setting prices above the marginal cost on one side while implementing zero price 
for the others. This pricing strategy has attracted the attention of competition authorities as it addresses excessive and predatory pricing behaviour in 
competition law terminology. Whether competition authorities’ intervention ends up enhancing competition in the market should be debated. The 
latest decision of the Turkish Competition Authority regarding sahibinden.com, one of the biggest platforms of vehicle and real estate trade, would 
be a good laboratory for discussion.
Introduction
Online-based multi-sided markets, or digital plat-forms, have become increasingly prominent businesses over the last three decades and have 
attracted the attention of economists and also govern-
ments in terms of regulatory requirements. 
According to the OECD (2018), by taking the common 
elements of various definitions, a multi-sided platform can 
be defined as: “a market in which a firm acts as a platform 
and sells different products to different groups of consumers, 
while recognizing that the demand from one group of custom-
er depends on the demand from the other group(s).”  
Platforms are convenient ground for two or more groups 
of users to get together for goods, services or information 
exchange. Apart from the traditional offline markets, the 
evident feature of the platforms is the so-called network ef-
fect, a phenomenon through which a good or service gains 
additional value as more agents use it. 
Maxwell and Penard (2015) underlined four economic 
features of digital platforms that can both constrain and 
stimulate competition. Firstly, such platforms have a spe-
cific cost structure − namely, high fixed costs and relatively 
low marginal costs of production − which creates econo-
mies of scale and induces a market structure dominated 
by few firms. They create large direct and indirect net-
work effects. Thirdly, platforms provide positive feedback; 
economies of scale and network effects work together to 
create positive feedback or self-reinforcing diffusion pro-
cesses, which causes strong platforms to become stronger 
and weak platforms to become weaker. Lastly, platforms 
are characterised by a fast pace of innovation, which can 
rebalance market power and facilitate entry. The dominant 
firms can never feel protected and must change contin-
uously to preserve their position and prevent other firms 
from innovating more quickly.
One of the main benefits of platforms is that they reduce 
transaction cost. Transaction costs are associated with trade 
of goods or services and incurred in overcoming market 
imperfections. Since platforms bring all sides in an inter-
active single place (such as a computer or mobile phone 
screen), asymmetric information is largely eliminated. 
Platforms offer a wide variety of products to consumers 
and make it easier for them to find the goods they are look-
ing for. Consumers often feel attracted by the presence of 
other consumers because it offers opportunities for social 
interaction and drawing benefits from each other’s experi-
ence (Martens 2016).  
Compared with offline markets, network effects lead to 
non-traditional pricing behaviour. Platforms may resort to 
setting prices below cost or mostly zero price to one group 
of users in order to make themselves more valuable to the 
other groups. This is likely to lead to them expanding their 
market share and revenue by leveraging network effects. 
The damages stemming from having below-cost prices are 
paid off through cross-subsidisation depending on the sup-
ply and demand elasticities. This has led to a variety of 
platform business models with fixed and variable pricing, 
cross-subsidisation for various parties in function of their 
measured behaviours and market power.
The strategy of setting prices above the marginal cost for 
one side while implementing zero-price for the others has 
drawn the attention of competition authorities because 
such a strategy addresses excessive and predatory pricing 
behaviours in competition law terminology. Competition 
authorities are disposed to think that high concentration 
ratios and dominant positions being observed in the mar-
kets are the consequence of such a pricing strategy, to-
gether with economies of scale and scope, which results in 
“winner-takes-all” or “lock-in” situations. Such reasoning 
may end up with authorities using competition law instru-
ments to intervene in platforms’ pricing strategies.  
As Martens (2016) noted, traditional competition pol-
icy assumes that a welfare-maximising competitive equi-
librium exists as long as prices reflect social value. In that 
* PhD, chief competition expert at Turkish Competition Authority, lecturer at Middle East Technical University, bgokdemir@rekabet.gov.tr
dossier
case, competition policy aims to alleviate the inefficiencies 
caused by market power and price distortions. Howev-
er, this approach does not fit well into digital platforms. 
Pricing on two sides of the market may not reflect social 
value and pricing practices may hurt some users but ben-
efit others. Still, the overall price structure may be wel-
fare-enhancing. When competition authorities consider 
an intervention to digital platforms, they should be aware 
that intervention on one side would affect the other side. 
A case-by-case overall analysis that includes all sides of the 
market is required.
Discussion on Turkish Competition Authority’s Latest 
Case on Digital Markets 
In the abovementioned context, the question of whether 
competition authorities’ intervention results in enhancing 
competition in the market, thereby serving social welfare 
maximisation, deserves to be debated. The latest contro-
versial decision by the Turkish Competition Authority 
(TCA) regarding sahibinden.com (Turkish Competition 
Authority, Decision Number 18-36/584-285, 1.10.2018), 
a leading digital platform for vehicle and real estate trading 
in Turkey, would be a good laboratory for debating. 
The Turkish Competition Board ruled that sahibinden.
com abused its dominant position by implementing ex-
cessive pricing to real estate agents and car dealers. The 
decision had not been made by consensus. On the other 
hand, four out of five rapporteurs argued that although 
sahibinden.com had a dominant position in the market 
and its prices against the vehicle and real estate traders in 
2014−2017 were higher than those of its rivals, sahibind-
en.com cannot be deemed to have abused its dominant po-
sition on the grounds that there is no evidence of negative 
effect of pricing on consumer welfare; also, thanks to the 
financially robust and strong national and international 
newcomers, the price of sahibinden.com is to converge to 
the level of competitive markets.         
In the early part of the decision, the TCA spelled out the 
peculiar features of digital multi-sided markets and un-
derlined that the market definition for digital platforms 
show considerable differences from traditional one-sided 
markets. According to the TCA, that is why the classical 
methods, such as SSNIP, could be insufficient when the 
relevant market is determined. By taking digital markets’ 
specific features, the TCA define two relevant markets as 
the on-line service market for real estate trading and the 
on-line service market for vehicle trading.
Following the market definition, excessive pricing be-
haviour is handled in the context of theory and Turkish 
competition law jurisprudence. By reference to the Turkish 
Council of State’s decisions, the TCA underlined that the 
main parameter to be taken into consideration in com-
petition law enforcement should be consumer welfare. 
However, the decision contains no analysis of the effect of 
excessive pricing on the consumer welfare. The matter of 
consumer welfare is discussed very briefly, only in the eval-
uation of the legal defence of sahibinden.com. In its legal 
defence, sahibinden.com alleged that the consumers were 
not negatively affected. In other words, there was neither 
welfare transfer from consumers to sahibinden.com nor 
welfare lost due to its pricing. 
Against this argument, the TCA argued, sahibinden.com 
misinterpreted the concept of consumer by limiting it to 
final consumers. By their nature, multi-sided digital plat-
forms have different consumer groups. From this point of 
view, the real estate and vehicle traders are the consumers 
of sahibinden.com and they were exposed to lost welfare 
because of sahibinden.com’s excessive prices. This is a con-
troversial interpretation in terms of economic theory. 
In the part of dominant position analysis, the TCA ex-
amine various parameters such as market share, number 
of visitors, number of corporate customers and income 
from corporate customers and ruled that sahibinden.com 
holds the dominant position in both markets. The TCA 
also highlighted that sahibinden.com has retained relative-
ly high market shares in both market over the years despite 
its higher prices, mostly thanks to a network effect creating 
entry barrier in digital markets. 
In order to determine whether sahibinden.com abused 
its dominant position during 2014−2017, the TCA ap-
plied the “economic value test”, which is also known as 
the “united brand test” and focuses on price-cost margin 
and benchmark prices. In that sense, the TCA compared 
the prices of sahibinden.com and its main rivals and con-
cluded that sahibinden.com’s were significantly higher (the 
exact numbers are not presented in the decision because of 
trade secrets). In terms of profit ratio, the TCA compared 
the profit ratio of sahibinden.com with the firms operating 
in different digital markets on the grounds that the price-
cost margin is not opaque because the total cost of the sa-
hibinden.com is hard to distribute among specific services. 
A profit-ratio comparison shows that the equity profitabil-
ity of sahibinden.com was significantly higher than that of 
its counterparts in different digital markets. 
Upon the said analyses, TCA ruled that sahibinden.
com has infringed Turkish Competition Law by abusing 
its dominance through excessive pricing. In the decision, 
TCA did not propose any specific remedy for terminating 
the infringement. Hence, sahibinden.com should deter-
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mine the price level, which is not deemed to be excessive 
and pull its price to this level.    
This decision has the potential to raise some questions 
with respect to whether it results in enhancing competition 
in the market. According to the decision, there were signif-
icant differences between the prices of sahibinden.com and 
its rivals at both markets. On the other hand, the network 
effect has led sahibinden.com to maintain its dominance. 
So, what is expected to happen when sahibinden.com re-
duces its price? Can the current rivals and newcomers gain 
market share or vice versa? What will be the reaction of 
potential rivals thinking about entering the market?  
Why did the TCA not consider potential competition? 
Various national and international digital platforms such 
as Letgo, Facebook Marketplace and zingat.com had just 
entered into market or prepared to enter at the time of 
investigation. The TCA alleges that those newcomers can-
not create competitive pressure on sahibinden.com due to 
the network effect. However, the risk of entrenched mo-
nopolies is very limited. For example, MySpace was the 
leading social media platform in the mid-2000s but has 
now almost disappeared. Nokia/Symbian was the leading 
technology platform for mobile phones but has now been 
replaced by a de facto oligopoly between Android, Apple 
iOS and Windows. Windows’ dominant position in the 
operating systems market is under increasing pressure from 
Apple iOS and other operating systems. Google AdWords’ 
strong position in the online advertising market is under 
pressure from Facebook advertising (Martens 2016). 
Why didn’t TCA pay regard to specific features of dig-
ital markets in its dominant power analysis as it did in 
the market definition analysis? As Evans and Schmalensee 
(2014) explained, “methods used in traditional markets are 
not adapted or reliable for ‘platform-based’ industries. Re-
liance on market share or price-cost margins in assessing 
market power is questionable. A platform serves multiple 
groups of customers with interdependent demands and 
uses complex price strategies. Market shares are not the 
best instrument or index to measure market power.”
The last critical question to be asked is how TCA came 
to the decision without conducting welfare analysis. As 
touched on above, the reasoning behind TCA’s decision 
is based on the argument that the real estate and vehicle 
traders are the consumers of sahibinden.com and they suf-
fered lost welfare. Is the TCA aware that such an approach 
clashes with welfare economics? 
Conclusion
All of the questions above have implied answers. Sa-
hibinden.com is expected to increase its market share after 
price adjustment. On the other hand, while some play-
ers will have to leave the market, potential rivals thinking 
about entering the market will give up. As a result, the 
market power of sahibinden.com will be strengthened by 
the TCA’s decision.   
By reference to Shelansky (2013) and Manne and Wright 
(2011), Maxwell and Penard (2015) raise an important 
issue in antitrust remedies. The risk of regulatory error 
is high when dealing with new Internet-based business 
models. Regulators have a systematic bias toward seeing 
anticompetitive conduct in new business models. More 
importantly, the cost of error is much higher in the case 
of a so-called “Type I” error (that is, when a regulator mis-
takenly imposes a remedy) than for a “Type II” error (that 
is, when a regulator mistakenly fails to impose a remedy). 
This leads to the conclusion that where there is significant 
uncertainty due to rapid technological and market chang-
es, regulators should err towards doing nothing rather than 
imposing a remedy.
Accordingly, Maxwell and Penard (2015) warned, the 
error costs of over-enforcement of antitrust laws in digi-
tal markets would be much higher than the error costs of 
under-enforcement. It can be very costly to regulate digital 
platform markets given the rapid pace of change in these 
markets. The guidelines in digital markets should be “first 
do no harm” to avoid counterproductive effects. The con-
sequence of the TCA’s over-enforcement will be observed 
and evaluated in the upcoming years. 
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OTT regulation in Turkey
Şahin ARDIYOK*, Sercan SAĞMANLIGIL**
Currently, one of the most controversial topics in the global regulatory debate on electronic communications is whether over-the-top (OTT) streaming 
media services should be regulated. This article explains why countries are so eager to regulate OTT services and scrutinizes the recent regulatory 
developments in Turkey.
Introduction
Rapid technological development has led to a grow-ing range of services being able to consume on-line. This has affected the competitive dynamics 
and technological scenarios in communication markets, 
and many Internet-based services that are usually called 
“over-the-top” (OTT) have been flourishing in the broad-
casting markets (BEREC, 2016). 
More than 75 percent of Internet traffic now consists of 
transmitting video content, while online videos watched 
from TV represent 25 percent of total internet traffic (Cis-
co, 2017). In addition, it is estimated that almost half of 
the adults in developed countries are subscribers to at least 
two services that provide visual and audio content on the 
Internet, and the number of these subscriptions is expected 
to double by 2020 (Deloitte, 2018). 
Most countries already have some kind of regulation of 
conventional media services, as for a long time these have 
been the main players in the broadcasting sector. However, 
as viewing habits of end-users have changed significantly, 
there is a need to revise the regulatory framework, which 
will primarily aim to set appropriate definitions, scopes, 
related obligations, etc. (TCA, 2017). 
In recent years, a number of countries, particularly in 
Europe, have placed more emphasis on OTT regulations. 
Pursuant to this tendency, Article 29/A is issued in the 
“Law no. 5651 on Regulation of Publications on The Internet 
and Suppression of Crimes Committed by Means of Such Pub-
lications” (Code) in order to set out the general outline of 
the proposed regulation regarding OTT services in Turkey.
This paper will initially address the question of what 
OTT is in media markets, before scrutinizing recent devel-
opments in Turkey in detail. In this context, the draft reg-
ulation will be evaluated by including a comparison with 
other countries’ regulations. Finally, potential amendment 
recommendations will be set out.
What is OTT?
From a general perspective, the term of “over the top” 
refers to the delivery of the film and TV content over in-
ternet without requiring a subscription to a traditional 
cable or satellite pay TV- service.  Accordingly, BEREC, 
which is an important organization in the electronic com-
munications sector, defines OTT as “a content, service or 
practice transmitted to end users on the Internet”. In line 
with BEREC’s approach, it can be argued that all services 
and applications provided on the Internet can be included 
within the scope of the OTT concept. Moreover, it means 
that Internet service providers (ISPs) only have a role in the 
distribution of the OTT service, as the production is solely 
provided by the OTT service provider (BEREC, 2016). 
The main reason why OTT services provided by a 
third-party content provider is that it provides the distri-
bution of the video or other media on the Internet without 
a multiple system operator. In this context, the ISP is not 
responsible for the content and has no ability to control it 
unless the video is purchased from an ISP such as IPTV, 
which is a television programming being communicated 
using the internet protocol. (Remy & Letamendia  2014). 
In this respect, OECD refers in the 2015 report of the 
OECD Working Group on Infrastructures and Service 
Policy to OTT services as “an alternative way of provid-
ing services on a broadband internet environment” (OECD, 
2015). According to the OECD, OTT services use simi-
lar network facilities as the other content and application 
providers. 
OTT services usually do not constitute a standalone ser-
vice, as the production of these services does not represent 
a value in itself. Therefore, they can only demonstrate their 
function in conjunction with the other elements of the 
network such as the transmission of the content.
BEREC also points out that OTT services should be re-
garded as electronic communication services if they poten-
tially compete with them (such as providing e-mail, mes-
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saging, etc.) In this respect, OTT services that are able to 
offer telecommunications services −  such as SMS, MMS, 
voice-over-Internet protocol (VOIP), text, images, calls, 
etc. − will be deemed services that challenge the telecom 
operators (Remy & Letamendia, 2014). Skype is the best-
known OTT service that can be substituted for conven-
tional communication services. On the other hand, it is 
worth emphasising that OTT services that do not relate 
to the electronic communication sector, such as Uber and 
Airbnb, should not be regarded as electronic communica-
tion services (BEREC, 2016).
Recent developments in Turkey concerning online 
video on-demand platforms
The Radio  and  Television  Supreme Board (RTUK) 
is  the  main authority for the regulation and supervision 
of radio, television and on-demand media services that are 
under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Turkey. In or-
der to achieve its primary objectives and determine the re-
quired administrative, financial and technical standards for 
the media service operators, the RTUK releases its second-
ary legislation pursuant to the Broadcasting Code, which is 
the primary source of law in broadcasting services.
Conventional media services such as cable, satellite and 
terrestrial networks have already been regulated by the sec-
ondary legislation of the RTUK. These regulations mainly 
aim to determine the principles and procedures for grant-
ing cable and satellite licenses and transmission authoriza-
tions to media service providers. 
Several video-on-demand (VOD) platforms have grown 
their presence in Turkey by targeting online users. There-
fore, lawmakers took VOD service providers into the scope 
of RTUK surveillance, through Article 29/A of the Code, 
which was passed by the Turkish Parliament and published 
in the Official Gazette on March 21, 2018. 
Article 29/A of the Code stipulates the obligation to 
obtain a licence from the RTUK to provide radio, televi-
sion and on-demand broadcasting services exclusively on 
the Internet. Along with some other provisions that set a 
general framework for the supervision of the RTUK over 
the VOD service providers, the new article stipulates that 
secondary legislation shall be issued jointly by the RTUK 
and the Information and Communication Technologies 
Authority (BTK). 
Although the RTUK released its draft regulation in the 
last quarter of 2018, the regulation has not been passed 
into law yet (as of the date of this article). As the draft 
regulation reflects the latest position of the RTUK for the 
supervision of internet broadcasting services, this paper 
will present its evaluations in line with the draft regulation. 
Critical Analysis of the Draft Regulation
The draft regulation consists of 24 articles that set out the 
main principles and procedures for broadcasting via the 
Internet. In this respect, the draft regulation mainly aims 
to clarify licensing conditions and the supervision of the 
RTUK over OTT service providers.
Although this article only evaluates limited issues regard-
ing the draft regulation, there are number of other aspects 
that can be taken into consideration. 
In this respect, this paper only scrutinizes the draft regu-
lation in line with the most controversial provisions related 
to the scope, authorization and content of the regulation.
The Scope
In line with the scope of the regulation, Article 2 includes 
any platforms providing radio, television and on-demand 
services over the Internet. However, in the second para-
graph, it exempts the following service providers from the 
scope of the regulation:
• Individual communication service
• Platforms whose main activity is not associated with 
the transmission of radio, television and on-demand 
broadcast services via the Internet
• Real and legal persons who provide only hosting for 
radio, television and on-demand broadcast services.
First of all, it can be inferred that any broadcasting ac-
tivity that targets the territory of Turkey, such as having 
subscribers from Turkey, will fall under the scope of the 
regulation. To assess this, the RTUK uses an impact analy-
sis to determine the range of its surveillance.
The most problematic issue will be defining the individ-
ual communication services and hosting service providers, 
as this directly relates to the determination of the involve-
ment of video-sharing platforms such as YouTube and 
Dailymotion. The draft regulation should not apply to an 
individual user who uploads a couple of videos to the vid-
eo-sharing platforms. On the other hand, the design of the 
current video-sharing platforms can easily allow the OTT 
service providers to broadcast their content over a channel 
opened in the platform. More specifically, a medium-sized 
OTT service provider in Turkey can easily take shelter in 
the YouTube channel in order to evade the legal obliga-
tions provided in the regulation. 
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According to Article 2, it is not quite clear whether those 
channels will be included within the scope of the regula-
tion; in fact, since it excludes the hosting service providers, 
one could argue that YouTube channels are not subject to 
the regulation.  
In this respect, it is possible to argue that the law should 
embrace a two-pronged approach towards video-sharing 
platforms. Individual communications such as personal 
vlogs should be put to one side and exempted from the 
scope of the regulation. On the other hand, corporate 
communications should be distinguished from other con-
tent in the video-sharing platforms and made subject to 
the legal obligations set forth in the regulation and, conse-
quently, in the Code.
As the main rationale of the OTT regulation is to deter-
mine the principles and procedures for OTT services that 
are now capable of generating a significant amount of busi-
ness, hosting service providers should not go unnoticed. In 
this context, it will be plausible to claim that OTT services 
provided through video-sharing platforms should be cov-
ered within the scope of the regulations as long as they 
are substitutable with other broadcasting content provided 
through the Internet.
However, the regulation could create an unfair advantage 
for hosting providers − specifically YouTube − over the 
OTT providers. In South Korea, for example, local firms 
are worried because YouTube is free from proper regula-
tion and poses a significant challenge to the country’s OTT 
industry (Digital TV Life, 2018). Hence, it is likely that 
many countries will likely embrace an inclusionary ap-
proach to regulating hosting service providers in the near 
future.
Broadcasting Authorization
According to Article 5 of the regulation, media service 
providers that offer radio, television and on-demand 
broadcast services only from the Internet will need to re-
quest a broadcasting license from the Supreme Council of 
the RTUK. In addition, the providers will have to apply 
for a transmission authorisation from the Supreme Coun-
cil of the RTUK. Pursuant to Article 8, before acquiring 
transmission authorisation, a provider must be established 
as a limited or joint stock company in accordance with the 
provisions of the Turkish Commercial Code.
Although strict OTT regulations have not been common 
until recently, many European countries now adopt vari-
ous authorisation procedures for OTT providers. In this 
respect, many of them prefer to stipulate a notification ob-
ligation for OTT providers. Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and the United Kingdom are examples of coun-
tries that put service providers under a notification obliga-
tion (Blaguez, 2016). In order to determine the scope of 
the notification obligation, the countries generally release 
a guideline that provides criteria for being subject to the 
obligation (OFCOM, 2018). 
On the other hand, Romania and Singapore regulate a 
similar authorisation regime with a draft regulation, as 
both countries lay down the licensing requirement as a 
condition, rather than a notification obligation. One could 
argue that countries that are relatively unattractive to for-
eign investors have a greater tendency to require licensing 
from the service providers. The main reason for this situ-
ation is that the countries strive to preclude tax avoidance 
by compelling service providers to establish a local compa-
ny that will be under a tax obligation within that country.
Similarly, it is clear that the regulation stipulates an au-
thorization process that leaves the service providers no 
choice but to establish a company in accordance with 
Turkish law. In this respect, the law aims to levy taxes 
on the income generated from Turkey’s territory over the 
Turkish establishment of the service providers.
Since the alternative ways of abstaining from tax avoid-
ance are quite limited within the scope of the international 
tax law, it can be accepted as a feasible policy that the leg-
islator intends to reduce tax loss by planning a licensing 
process that stipulates the permanent establishment of the 
service provider.
The Content
The regulation aims to impose surveillance over the con-
tent of the broadcasting provided through the Internet. 
Although the regulation does not provide details on how 
this surveillance over the content will be implemented, it 
can be inferred that one of the significant purposes of the 
surveillance will be the protection of children.
This policy seems quite probable as the European Union 
also mainly targets the protection of the children with its 
Audiovisual Media Services Directive. According to the di-
rective, Member States should take necessary precautions 
to protect minors from harmful content. Those precau-
tions include scheduling restrictions, technical measures or 
visual indicators (EBU). In this respect, it can be clearly 
inferred that the directive does not prohibit harmful con-
tent; it only stipulates the obligation to take measures to 
prevent children from viewing the inappropriate content.
From this point of view, this paper suggests that the reg-
ulation should provide more certainty for the service pro-
viders over whether they are obliged to cut out all inappro-
priate content for the sake of protecting children. As it will 
not be cost-effective for the service providers to do this, 
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the regulation should determine the necessary precautions 
that the service providers should take in order to broadcast 
their content. For example, the encrypted channels can be 
exempted from content limitations as long as they keep the 
content out of the reach of children.
Conclusion
In conclusion, regulating OTT services should be re-
garded as an appropriate approach for Turkey since the in-
come generated from those services is increasing every day. 
Therefore, putting the OTT services under surveillance 
will bring the treatment of the conventional broadcasting 
sector and the new technologies into balance.
On the other hand, the regulatory body must be careful 
not to ignore the business needs of the OTT service pro-
viders when stipulating new rules on the sector. Regula-
tions that go too far could discourage the service providers 
from making significant investments in Turkey.
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Mega Istanbul Airport
Tuba Toru Delibaşı*
This paper shows that the planned number of passengers at Istanbul Airport can be reached if the Turkish economy grows to its 
potential over the next 25 years. However, the airport may only reach the capacity of 120 million passengers by the 2050s if 
economic growth rates stay below the potential level 5 per cent for the period 2013−2019, 4 per cent for the period 2020−2030 
and 2 per cent for the period 2031−2043.
Introduction
Turkey has undergone major development in air transportation since the industry was deregulat-ed in 2003. The increasing capacity of airlines, as 
well as the development of Turkish Airlines after its partial 
privatization, led to a significant increase in air traffic in 
Turkey. Air traffic grew by an average of 16 per cent per 
year in from 2002 to 2012, compared to 5 per cent an-
nually around the world. Istanbul Ataturk Airport (IST) 
provided approximately 35 per cent of Turkey’s total pas-
senger traffic with 45 million passengers in 2012, and it 
was expected that the number of passengers would exceed 
65 million by 2019. Therefore, the authorities decided to 
build a new airport in May 2012. 
Istanbul Airport, which is built on around 7600 hectares, 
is expected to be the world’s largest airport in terms of pas-
senger traffic. The airport is planned to be built in three 
phases. In the first phase, the new airport is constructed to 
accommodate 90 million passengers. There are plans to in-
crease the capacity of the new airport to 120 million in the 
second phase and then to 150 million in third phase. Istan-
bul Airport, which took over the Ataturk Airport’s opera-
tions, is the only airport on the European side of Istanbul. 
This mega-project has raised debate regarding environ-
mental concerns and profitability. In this paper, I focus on 
the latter and provide a feasibility analysis on the new Is-
tanbul Airport. To do this, I first simulate the number of 
passengers under two different scenarios for the following 
30 years through an econometric model, and then predict 
the aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues depending 
on the predicted number of passengers to assess the feasi-
bility of the new airport. 
Is the expected number of passengers realistic?
The enplaned passenger forecasts are developed using a 
bottom-up approach based on a regression model using 
socioeconomic variables. I regressed the number of pas-
sengers on the real ticket prices, real GDP and population. 
After obtaining the regression parameters, the number of 
passengers (domestic, international and connecting sepa-
rately) for each year between 2013 and 2043 are simulated 
under two different scenarios. 
In Scenario 1, the growth rate of real GDP is taken as 5 
per cent for the period 2013−2019, 4 per cent for the peri-
od 2020−2030 and 2 per cent for the period 2031−2043, 
according to the OECD medium and long term predic-
tions (OECD 2012). However, the realization of the po-
tential growth rate is possible only if the necessary struc-
tural reforms are performed in order to overcome the 
restriction such as low savings and low competition power. 
If the necessary structural reforms are not made, then the 
potential growth rate will not be attained. Hence, I set up 
Scenario 2, which has lower economic growth rates such 
as 4 per cent for the first period, 3 per cent for the second 
period and 1.5 per cent for the last period (Gursel and 
Toru, 2013). I adapt Turkish Statistics Institute (TUIK) 
population increase projection; that is, 1.02 per cent for 
the first period, 0.74 per cent for the second period and 
0.36 per cent for the last period (TUIK, 2012). Consid-
ering ticket fares, I posit an increase of 3 per cent, 2 per 
cent and 1.5 per cent for the respective periods. Note that 
the two scenarios differ only in terms of economic growth 
assumptions.
Having predicted the total number of passengers, I de-
rive domestic, international and transit passengers accord-
ing to past observations. In other words, I first project the 
growth rate of domestic and total international (that is, 
international and transit) passengers in the Ataturk Airport 
during 2005−2012 on the first period. Then, the shares 
of domestic passengers and international passengers in the 
total number of passengers are taken as 26 per cent and 
74 per cent, respectively, for 2019−2043. For 2012−2043, 
the average annual growth rates are 4.9 per cent for total 
number of passengers, 4 per cent for domestic and 5.3 for 
international passengers under Scenario 1. Considering 
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Scenario 2, the rates are 3.1 per cent, 2.2 per cent and 3.5 
per cent, respectively. In order to identify the number of 
transit passengers, I use the observations from Turkish Air-
lines. Precisely, I assess the variation of this during the peri-
od from 2005 to 2012, then reflect the rate of variation on 
the period 2013−2043. The total number of passengers at 
the new airport will be 80 million under Scenario 1 and 68 
million under Scenario 2 in 2019. The distribution of do-
mestic, international and transit passengers are 21 million, 
38 million and 22 million, respectively, under Scenario 1, 
and 18 million, 32 million and 19 million passengers, re-
spectively, under Scenario 2.  
Note that 90 million passengers are targeted for the new 
Istanbul airport in 2019; the capacity utilization in terms 
of the number of passengers will be 89 per cent under Sce-
nario 1. This capacity utilization rate is  acceptable (Vaze 
and Barnhart 2011). However, in Scenario 2 the capacity 
utilization rate will be 76 per cent. 
Remember that the targeted number of passengers is 120 
million and 150 million for the last two phases. To deter-
mine whether these targets are realistic, I predict the num-
ber of passengers until the end of the consortium’s con-
tract. According to the results, the new airport could reach 
its 150-million-passenger capacity by the 2030s in Scenar-
io 1. Hence, a capacity of 90 million in the first stage seems 
more than reasonable and 150 million passengers would be 
achieved around 2030. In Scenario 2, however, the num-
ber of passengers barely reaches 70 million in 2019 and the 
planned airport could reach a maximum capacity of 117 

















2013 54.0 17.3 36.7 23.4 13.3
2019 80.3 20.9 59.4 37.9 21.6
2030 158.2 41.1 117.0 74.5 42.5









2012−2043 4.9 4.0 5.3 5.2 5.6
2012−2019 8.6 4.6 10.4 9.6 11.9
2019−2030 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4









2013 52.8 16.9 35.9 22.9 13.0
2019 68.9 17.9 51.0 32.5 18.5
2030 106.4 27.7 78.7 50.2 28.6









2012−2043 3.1 2.2 3.5 3.3 3.8
2012−2019 6.2 2.3 8.0 7.2 9.4
2019−2030 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
2030−2043 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
Table 1. The Number of Passengers (million) and the Growth Rates (%) under Scenario 1
Source: Author’s own computations 
* Actual values in 2012
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Operating Revenue and Cost Analysis for the New 
Istanbul Airport
The second main question is about how the airport could 
become profitable despite its huge costs. To assess the fea-
sibility of the new airport, I predict the aeronautical and 
non-aeronautical (commercial) revenues depending on the 
predicted number of passengers.
According to the conditions of the bid, the new airport 
will charge 20 Euros per international passenger, 5 Euros 
per transit passenger and 3 Euros per domestic passenger. 
The total passenger revenue is calculated by multiplying 
these prices by the corresponding number of enplaned 
passengers. Considering the revenue obtained from land-
ing, I obtain the number of aircraft landing by dividing 
the number of domestic and international passengers by 
the average number of passengers per aircraft (123). I then 
multiply the number of aircraft landing by the average 
maximum aircraft weight (190 tons). The regulated prices 
listed by General Directorate of State Airports Authority 
of Turkey (DHMI) are used to obtain the landing revenue 
(DHMI, 2013). The fees charged to passenger like airport 
security are collected under the name of other passenger 
revenue, which is assumed to be one-quarter of the passen-
ger revenue, similar to Hartsfield−Jackson Atlanta Interna-
tional Airport (FAA, 2012). Following the statement of the 
consortium and the financial statement of Atlanta Airport, 
I assume that the commercial (non-aeronautical) revenue 
will be double the revenue from passengers. To compute 
the operating cost, I assume that the profit margin will be 
30 per cent for the new airport, similar to the other two 
airports in Istanbul − Ataturk and Sabiha Gokcen airports 
(Operation Report of TAV and Malaysia Airports, 2012). 
In Scenario 1, the passenger airline revenue is estimated 
to be 998 million Euros and the other operating revenue 
is 1.996 billion Euros. Then, the total operating revenue is 
computed to be 2.995 billion Euros and the operating cost 
is 2.96 billion Euros under the assumption of 30 per cent 
profit margin.
Besides the operating revenue and cost, I need to consid-
er the bid conditions that also generate some revenue and 
cost to the consortium. Firstly, the Treasury gives a guar-
antee on the number of passengers such that it will pay the 
consortium 6.3 billion Euros for the first 12 years covering 
the international and transit passengers. This means that if 
the consortium obtains less than 525 million Euros of pas-
senger revenue from international and transit passengers, 
the Treasury will transfer the difference to the consortium. 
If the consortium gathers more than 525 million Euros, it 
will transfer the difference to the Treasury. For example, in 
2019, as the revenue from total international passengers is 
432.9 million Euros, which is less than the guarantee, the 
Treasury will transfer 92.5 million Euros to the consorti-
um in the first scenario.
Secondly, the consortium promised to pay approximately 
26.1 billion Euros (including VAT) for 25 years, starting 
from 2019 and ending in 2043. Hence, the rent paid by 
the consortium will be 1.45 billion Euros per year. Thirdly, 
the consortium is planning to take a loan of 6 billion Eu-
ros for construction cost of about 7.5 billion Euros. Nihat 
Ozdemir, CEO of LIMAK, mentioned that it would be 
possible to find a loan for 16 years without repayments for 
the first four years. Therefore, I assume that the consorti-
um will have a loan for 16 years without repayments for 
the first four years at an interest rate of 4 per cent per year. 
I compute the interest rate by adding a half point of risk 
premium to the Eurobond interest rate of 3.5 per cent. 
This interest rate is the lowest rate that the consortium 
could find under the current economic conditions. Under 
these assumptions, the repayment of the loan will be 628.9 
million Euros per year.
In Scenario 1, the consortium will have a loss of 683.5 
million Euros. That is to say, the operating profit of airport 
will not be sufficient to pay the rent and the loan repay-
ments. The situation will be even worse in the case of low 
economic growth (Scenario 2) and the loss will be equal 
to 749.7 million Euros when the airport starts to operate.
In these computations, I only consider the operating rev-
enue (that is, predicted aeronautical and commercial reve-
nues), operating cost and the bid conditions. However, it 
is well known that the operating services are not the only 
revenue resource for airports. There are non-operating ac-
tivities (passenger facilities, real estate, sponsorship, etc.) 
that generate extra revenue for airports. For instance, the 
new airport can charge an extra fee to passengers through 
passenger facility fees, which are collected to finance cer-
tain projects at the airport. 
Predicted Return of the Consortium
Table 2 presents the revenue and cost of the new airport 
for the entire contract period. Recall that I have considered 
the prices charged to passenger by the airport to be con-
stant for the period 2019−2043. However, the tariff may 
change for the following years.
Under the constant price assumption, the new airport is 
expected to post losses until 2030, when the loans are re-
paid. The accumulative loss would reach 5.7 billion Euros 
in Scenario 1 and 7.7 billion Euros in Scenario 2 by 2030. 
However, the planned airport could accumulate profit of 
Network Industries Quarterly |  Vol. 21 | N°2 | June 2019              16
dossier
7.2 billion Euros by the end of 2043 in the first scenario, 
but the new airport would suffer a loss of 4.8 billion Euros 
by 2043 in the second scenario. 
The results show that the operating revenue of the new 
airport will not be sufficient to cover operating cost, rent 
and loan repayments. Unless the non-operating revenues 
are high enough, the new Istanbul airport as a business will 
not be profitable under the existing rental conditions and 
predicted revenues.
Conclusion
The Istanbul Airport will only reach its potential of 150 
million passengers in the 2030s if Turkey as a country 
achieves sustainable growth; otherwise, the airport may 
only reach a capacity of 120 million passengers by the 
2050s. Hence, the expected number of passenger traffic 
will not be attained during the contract period if economic 
growth remains below its potential. Particularly, if the eco-
nomic growth remains below its potential due to a failure 
to implement key structural reforms, passenger traffic will 
remain below 120 million in 2043. Therefore, the require-
ment for a mega-airport in Istanbul depends crucially on 
the future growth performance of the Turkish economy.
The results show that, in Scenario 1, cumulative losses of 
5.7 billion Euros appear until 2030 because of rent and loan 
instalments. However, these losses are largely compensated 
by large profits and the cumulative profit is estimated to 
reach 7.2 billion Euros by the end of the end of the tender 
period. Nevertheless, in Scenario 2, the cumulative losses 
are estimated to be 4.8 billion Euros. The profitability of 
the mega-airport might be problematic unless the consor-
tium succeeds in raising enough non-operational revenue 
from real estate developments in the extensive area (7400 
hectares) provided to the new airport. As the consortium 
could not undertake such losses, there would be two pos-
sibilities: the loss would most probably be compensated by 
extra charges on passengers or the consortium would try to 
get some non-operational incomes on the land.
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2019 3.0 3.8 -0.7 2.6 3.5 -0.7
2030 5.9 5.8 -0.2 4 4.5 -0.5
2043 7.5 6.3 1.2 4.4 4.1 0.3
2019−2030 total 52.0 56.5 -5.7 39 47.4 -7.7
2031−2043 total 88.6 75.6 13.0 55 52.1 2.9
2019−2043 total 140.6 132.1 7.3 94 99.5 -4.8
Table 2. Revenue and Cost, 2019−2043 (billion Euros)
Source: Author’s own computations 
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Problems Regarding Legal Infrastructure of Unlicensed 
Electricity Generation in Turkey
Muzaffer EROĞLU*
Turkey has been seeking to increase electricity production capacity from renewable energy resources for years, and many rules and 
regulations have been introduced for this purpose. Even though the efforts resulted with increased renewable electricity capacity, 
the initiatives have had some negative effects on both the industry and consumers. 
Introduction
Like many other countries, Turkey has been aiming to increase its electricity production capacity from renewable resources. Because renewable electricity 
production is a part of the whole electricity network sys-
tem, renewable production must be in harmony with the 
electricity network, and regulations regarding renewable 
energy should consider these aspects. Turkey has a liberal 
electricity market thanks to the de-regulation and re-reg-
ulation process that has occurred over the last 20 years. 
However, the electricity market is still heavily regulated 
by acts and by by-laws introduced by the Energy Market 
Regulatory Authority (EMRA). The EMRA determines 
the rules applied to network operators and other actors, 
such as generators and traders. For example, every com-
pany must obtain a licence in order to conduct business 
in the electricity market. On the other hand, even though 
there are still profound interferences to the market, trade 
amongst market participants and between traders and cus-
tomers are principally based on private law contracts. 
In order to increase capacity in renewable electricity, Tur-
key has complex rules and regulations in order to support 
electricity production from renewable resources. As a rule, 
renewable production facilities must obtain a production 
licence. The law provides purchase guarantee from renewa-
ble resources for 10 years from the start of production and 
the price is established by the Law No. 5346 on the Use 
of Renewable Energy Resources for Generating Electrici-
ty. In 2013 Turkey introduced a new model for electricity 
production from renewable sources, which allowed elec-
tricity production without a licence (The Regulation on 
Electricity Generation without a License enacted on 2 Oc-
tober 2013). According to the new regulation, producers 
up to a certain threshold capacity (originally 1000 kWh, 
increased to 5000 kWh on 10 May 2019) are exempted 
from the obligation to obtain a licence. The reason behind 
this regulation is to encourage small scale production by 
market participants for self-use purposes and increase ca-
pacity in renewable electricity. The expectation was to sup-
port participants to produce their own electricity without 
the burden of obtaining licence. However, there have been 
many problems regarding the new regulation and it has 
created enormous bureaucracy rather than reducing it. The 
problems came from various perspectives, such as network 
access, a lack of capacity in networks, competition law in-
fringements, access to incentive schemes and many private 
law problems during the installation process. 
Due to these problems, there should be an analysis of 
whether it is possible to achieve increasing renewable ener-
gy production without incentives and excessive regulation. 
I will discuss whether there is still a need for incentives for 
electricity production from renewable sources or whether 
free-market rules should apply. I examine unlicensed elec-
tricity regulation as an example. 
Electricity Generation and Renewable Regulation in 
Turkey
In Turkey, Electricity Market Law (EML) requires any 
production company to obtain a licence, with the excep-
tion of renewable energy producers with capacity of up to 
*PhD, Assistant Professor, Kocaeli University, Law School, Kocaeli, Turkey, muzaffereroglu@gmail.com
Table 1. Incentives for Renewable Energy
Source: Renewable Law Schedule 1
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1 MW (recently increased to 5 MW) (see Gedik & Erak-
soy 2017). However, due to requirements of network ac-
cess and other technical issues, there are a heavy set of rules 
and procedures that unlicensed producers are required to 
follow in order to operate (see EMRA 2018). As a rule, 
small producers are required to produce electricity for their 
own consumption but are allowed to sell access produc-
tion to last resource traders, which are legally forced to buy 
access production (Table 1). The incentives apply for 10 
years from the commencement of the production. The tar-
iff for all renewable electricity purchasing is determined by 
the renewable electricity legislation. 
As a result, even though the system called unlicensed 
production, there are many regulations that actually bring 
them closer to production with a licence. In fact, there is 
not even free access to the market as there are many capac-
ity restrictions determined by the EMRA, which means 
that only a small proportion of willing entrepreneurs can 
find the capacity to establish an unlicensed production fa-
cility.  
The main purpose of unlicensed electricity regulation was 
to promote renewable energy capacity, which is considered 
good for the environment as it keeps carbon emission 
levels relatively stable. In addition, renewable energy 
is important for controlling the current account deficit. 
With this belief, Turkey introduced a renewable energy 
law in 2005 and allowed unlicensed renewable from 2013. 
Productions with and without licence regulations overlap, 
but also have many different aspects. The biggest difference 
is that up to a certain capacity generations are exempted 
from licensing and the requirement of establishing limited 
liability companies. Moreover, unlicensed plants are con-
nected to distribution while plants with a licence are con-
nected transmission networks (Table 2). 
Renewable Electricity and Incentives
There have been immense technological developments 
regarding renewable energy in recent years. According to 
many reports, renewable energy is much cheaper to pro-
duce than electricity from fossil fuel (IRENA 2019). The 
installation process has become plain and the power plants 
have become more efficient. The economic explanation of 
incentives must be based on a cost and benefit analysis. 
Liberalisation of the electricity market requires companies 
to produce at a low cost and sell at a profit. In this model, 
price will be determined by free trade principles amongst 
market actors. However, in renewable energy production, 
the regulation introduces purchase guarantees at a fixed 
price. The reason behind these guarantees is the belief that 
the renewable production is expensive and requires incen-
tives for companies to invest in renewable energy. Howev-
er, the time of high cost has already passed as renewable 
energy production is much cheaper than electricity from 
fossil fuels.  
There is a common belief that there is public good for 
giving incentives to renewable energy, and thus must be 
supported even though it creates extra cost for last users. 
However, this set of rules interferes with the basic princi-
ples of a liberal market and a liberal pricing system. The 
ultimate financial burden of incentives is eventually carried 
by the last users of electricity. Table 3 below shows how 
Table 2. Unlicensed Energy Capacity as February 2019
Source: EMRA 2019
Energy Resource Established Power (MW) Rate (%)
Sun 5109.45 94.26































1,292,952,047.93 281.18 25.52 4,598,325.47 23,124,311.87 19.88
2019 
February
2,833,459,226.49 446.03 66.18 6,352,641.00 22,901,148.20 27.74
Table 3. Incentives Paid for Renewable Energy and Average Cost
Source: EMRA 2019
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the specific economic regulation should discontinue and 
general laws and regulations should prevail. However, with 
unlicensed electricity regulations the state created another 
complex rule. In this case, the market cannot self-correct. 
There has been much regulatory interference to reduce the 
negative effects on the market (see Yeşil Ekonomi 2019). 
For example, the law was changed just before this paper 
was submitted , increasing the minimum capacity for un-
licensed production by 5 MW. However, purchase guaran-
tee was determined as last-resource trade tariffs determined 
by the EMRA, which actually reduces the cost by around 
30 per cent. However, these constant interferences to leg-
islation create an excessive and unpredictable regulatory 
environment for market participants. 
Private law problems: Many of the unlicensed produc-
ers were small companies with no market experience. They 
have experienced many problems regarding their oper-
ations from private law perspectives such as partnership 
agreements, land use, project financing, insurance, pur-
chase and maintenance of products. As a result, much of 
the production capacity has been transferred to proficient 
electricity producers. This valuable capacity gives these 
producers unfair competitive advantages over other elec-
tricity producers.
Conclusion 
Constant regulatory interference to liberal markets with 
the intention of supporting renewable energy production 
creates excessive regulation. As a result, regulation regard-
ing economic issues through renewable incentive schemes 
that interferes with liberal market creates more problems 
than public interest. The regulation of economic aspects of 
electricity production should be left to contract law, com-
mercial law and competition law. General laws and regu-
lations will be sufficient to create a fair market model as 
the incentive-based model creates unfair competition and 
unfair wealth transfer. In my opinion, the time has come 
to create simpler regulation for electricity production. The 
regulation should cover technical issues while trade issues 
should be left to general regulation. Incentives must be 
abandoned as they create more complex system in which 
last users bear the ultimate cost. It is better to leave it to 
professional energy companies to produce electricity for 
profit purposes, regardless of whether it is renewable or 
not.
much support is provided for renewable and unlicensed 
renewable energy. 
On the other hand, in February 2019, there were 584.812 
MWh productions from unlicensed renewable and almost 
all of them were sold excess capacity (567.022 MWh) and 
producers were paid TL 392.826.163. Most of the capaci-
ty (91,50 %) comes from the sun (EMRA 2019).
Problems Regarding Unlicensed Production 
There are several problems regarding unlicensed renewa-
ble production. 
Problems regarding how to determine self-use and ex-
cess production: The regulation did not require producers 
to have any percentage of self-use. In this case, most of 
the capacity established (around 98 per cent) is intended 
to benefit from incentives rather than self-use. Moreover, 
multiple site ownership adjacent to each other was al-
lowed, which is similar to licensed production. This creates 
double standards between licensed and unlicensed produc-
ers; even though they have the same conditions, unlicensed 
producers are given unfair advantages.
Problems regarding incentives: There is a big problem 
with economic regulations when the regulation is used as 
a market maker in a liberal economy. Renewable incentive 
regulation actually standardises the future incentives with 
fixed price purchase guarantees. The incentives are deter-
mined by the law and in US dollars. However, exchange 
rates are unpredictable in Turkey. During the economic 
slow-down in Turkey in 2018−2019, the dollar was up by 
almost 50 per cent against the Turkish lira (See XE 2019). 
As an example, in April 2019 the average price of market 
exchange was around TL 262 and the last resource tariff 
was around TL 300, while average support for whole re-
newable sources in Turkey in February was TL 450. How-
ever, renewable energy from the sun, which holds almost 
the whole unlicensed renewable capacity, cost more than 
TL 600. Currently, production from the sun might sell 
without incentives at as little as USD 0.02 (Energysage 
2019). As a result, this law creates a wealth transfer from 
consumers to producers as renewable electricity produc-
tion is competitive even without incentives. 
The problem of excess regulation: Electricity market is 
already heavily regulated due to its nature. In addition to 
general regulation there is a separate set of regulations for 
renewable productions. Moreover, unlicensed productions 
created regulation within the regulations. Creating more 
and more regulations does not help efficient operation 
and this complex structure creates unpredictable market 
conditions. In my opinion, liberalisation process should 
take a short time and once a market has been liberalised, 
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 21, issue 3, 2019 (September)
“Digital Platforms – The New Network Industries? How to regulate them?”
Presentation of the next issue
Digitalisation is transforming all industries, including the network industries. It is creating a new model of 
industrial organisation using online platform as intermediaries for multisided markets. As a matter of fact, 
digital platforms display all characteristics of the traditional network industries: network effects, efficiency, 
scale, concentration, market power, etc.
The involvement of online platforms in the network industries benefits consumers by fulfilling unmet needs, 
often efficiently and at low cost. Platforms do this partly by exploiting access to existing network infrastruc-
tures that are often vital for national economic growth and wellbeing. However, if online platforms are allowed 
to sideline traditional network operators, it may mean that vital investment in building and maintaining the 
infrastructures on which these markets are founded becomes unsustainable in the long-term.
Another pertinent issue concerns the regulatory approach to platforms, as the success of online platforms is 
achieved, in part, by exploiting regulatory environments that place incumbent firms at a disadvantage. There 
is a debate as to whether platforms should be subject to the same regulatory obligations as traditional network 
players, and whether platforms should have access to network services under regulated terms.
The next issue of the Network Industries Quarterly (NIQ) will be dedicated to some of the best papers presented at the 
8th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures, which is organised by the Florence School of Regulation in June 
2019. Selected academics and practitioners have been invited to Florence to discuss the latest developments in the reg-
ulation of different network industries, namely transport, energy, telecoms and water distribution. Both the Conference 
and the next issue of the NIQ have a special focus on key challenges of digitalisation for traditional network industries, 
various regulatory approaches to platforms and benefit scenarios for consumers and to the platforms itself.
More information
If you are interested in learning more about the “8th Conference on the Regulation of Infrastructures. Digital Platforms 
– The New Network Industries? How to regulate them?” and the next issue of the Network Industries Quarterly, please 
send an email to Ms. Irina Lapenkova  at FSR.Transport@eui.eu.
Network Industries Quarterly |  Vol. 21 | N°2 | June 2019              23
« au service de l’analyse » — since 1998
 vol. 17  I  n°2  I  2015
quarterly
quarterly
Implementation of the liberalization process has brought various 
challenges to incumbent firms operating in sectors such as air transport, 
telecommunications, energy, postal services, water and railways, as well as to 
new entrants, to regulators and to the public authorities.
Therefore, the Network Industries Quarterly is aimed at covering research 
findings regarding these challenges, to monitor the emerging trends, as well 
as to analyze the strategic implications of these changes in terms of regulation, 
risks management, governance and innovation in all, but also across, the 
different regulated sectors. 
The Network Industries Quarterly, published by the Chair MIR (Management 
of Network Industry, EPFL) in collaboration with the Transport Area of the 
Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute), is an open 
access journal funded in 1998 and, since then, directed by Prof Matthias Finger.
Open Call For Papers
The Network Industries Quarterly is a multidisciplinary international 
publication. Each issue is coordinated by a guest editor, who chooses four 
to six different articles all related to the topic chosen. Articles must be high-
quality, written in clear, plain language. They should be original papers 
that will contribute to furthering the knowledge base of network industries 
policy matters. Articles can refer to theories and, when appropriate, deduce 
practical applications. Additionally, they can make policy recommendations 
and deduce management implications. 
Detailed guidelines on how to submit the articles and coordinate the issue 
will be provided to the selected guest editor. 
Article Preparation
Published four times a year, the Network Industries Quarterly contains short analytical 
articles about postal, telecommunications, energy, water, transportation and network 
industries in general. It provides original analysis, information and opinions on current 
issues. Articles address a broad readership made of university researchers, policy 
makers, infrastructure operators and businessmen. Opinions are the sole responsibility 
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